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Indigenous Management Strategies and Socioeconomic
Impacts of Yartsa Gunbu (Ophiocordyceps sinensis)
Harvesting in Nubri and Tsum, Nepal
Geoff Childs and
Namgyal Choedup

The harvesting and selling of yartsa gunbu
(literally ‘summer grass, winter worm’;
Ophiocordyceps sinensis) is contributing to
economic and social transformations across
the Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan region
faster than any development scheme could
envision. Meanwhile, the rising demand for the
commodity has been linked to violence and
environmental degradation, and has generated
concerns over resource sustainability. Although
good data is emerging on harvesting practices,
medical uses, and the booming market for
yartsa gunbu, especially in Tibetan areas of
China, little systematic research has explored
village-level management practices and
socioeconomic impacts. This paper seeks to
partially fill that void through a case study of
the yartsa gunbu harvest in Nubri and Tsum,
contiguous valleys in Nepal inhabited by ethnic
Tibetans. Using data from household surveys
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and in-depth interviews, the authors describe
the process of gathering and selling yartsa
gunbu within the parameters of management
practices that combine religious and secular
regulations over natural resources. The authors
conclude with a discussion of the indigenous
management system in relation to sustainable
development.
Keywords: Nepal, Tibetans, caterpillar fungus, Ophiocordyceps
sinensis, yartsa gunbu, natural resource management,
sustainable development.

Although bikas (development) has been a central
component of Nepal’s national narrative since the 1960s
(Pigg 1992; Des Chene 1996; Onta 1996), some parts of the
country, including highland communities populated by
ethnic Tibetans, have benefitted very little from stateinitiated development projects. In Nubri and Tsum,
contiguous valleys in northern Gorkha District that border
China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the state failed
to develop basic services like health care facilities and
schools beyond a rudimentary level. Despite being bypassed by development, residents of these valleys are now
reaping economic rewards that were unthinkable a decade
ago. They are doing so by devising strategies to regulate a
lucrative resource, yartsa gunbu (literally ‘summer grass,
winter worm’; Ophiocordyceps sinensis, also known as
‘caterpillar fungus’), in a way that resembles an indigenous
form of ‘sustainable development’.
Yartsa gunbu is endemic to the grasslands and alpine
regions of the Tibetan Plateau and surrounding valleys of
the Himalaya (Winkler 2008a). The fungus parasitizes and
mummifies the earth-dwelling larva of several Thitarodes
ghost moth species to form a fungus-caterpillar complex.1
The use of yartsa gunbu in Tibetan and Chinese medicine
has a long history. Today yartsa gunbu is widely traded as
a powerful tonic in Chinese medicine, is often referred to
as ‘Himalayan Viagra’ in the media,2 and has become such
an important commodity that scholars nominated it to be
China’s national fungus (Zhang et al. 2012: 2-3).
With an eight-fold increase in value from ¥4,800 to ¥40,000
per pound (Winkler 2008b: 18) yartsa gunbu has become
the mainstay of household economies across the Tibetan
Plateau and in the highlands of Nepal, India, and Bhutan.
It fills an economic void in Tibetan areas of China that
state-sponsored development projects, which tend to focus
on infrastructure, do not always satisfy. Winkler points
out, “Unlike many other natural resources in the region,
such as timber, gold and also increasingly hydroelectricity,
where the profits are captured by the state sector, fungal
income (and other income from wild collected plants) goes
directly to rural households” (2005: 77). The yartsa gunbu
harvest neither interferes with other economic activities
nor requires sophisticated technology and capital. “Thus,”
Winkler argues, “resource access is assured to the people,
who are otherwise marginalized by government control of
local resources such as timber, by lack of formal education,
lack of access to credit, etc.” (2005: 77).
In addition to bringing economic benefits, the yartsa
gunbu harvest can have negative consequences such as
the degradation of pasturelands and violence (Devkota

2010: 96; Gruschke 2011: 227; Yeh and Lama 2013: 8). In
recent incidents, in June 2014 a clash with police in Dolpo
left two dead in a dispute between members of the local
community and a National Park Buffer Zone Management
Committee over who has the right to collect and keep fees
paid by outsiders for access to yartsa gunbu grounds (The
Record 2014). On 30 May 2013, at least two people died in
a fight between Tibetan groups in the area of Rebgong,
China (RFA 2013). This event prompted the Dalai Lama to
issue a rare plea to Tibetans to shun violence and draw
upon traditional values and practices to resolve territorial
issues of access.
Despite yartsa gunbu’s importance to rural economies
and potential links to social discord, environmental
degradation, and economic dependency, there is still a
lot we do not know about its impact on highland Tibetan
communities of Nepal. This paper describes the situation
in Nubri and Tsum where yartsa gunbu has been collected
by local medical practitioners for centuries, but only
became a critical part of people’s household economies
within the last decade. Following a literature review,
we use Nubri and Tsum as case studies to illustrate how
some communities are dealing with a phenomenon that is
transforming people’s lives faster than any development
scheme could envision.
Overview of Management Practices
Our literature review reveals a patchwork of management
practices across the Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan
region. Many areas permit outsiders to collect yartsa gunbu
providing they pay a fee. This is the case in Dolpa, Nepal
(Devkota 2010; Knight 2012; Shrestha and Bawa 2013),
Kumaon, India (Garbyal et al., 2004), Dongwa Village in
Yunnan (Stewart 2014), and some counties in China’s TAR
where non-residents can purchase permits ranging from
¥300-¥1,500 Yuan ($40-$200) (Winkler 2008a). In Domkhok
Township, Qinghai, households lease land to outsiders
for fees ranging from ¥10,000-¥15,000 ($1,300-$2,000) per
person. One area is controlled by four households who
only permit 80 outsiders to gather each season. By leasing
land during the picking season each household receives
¥200,000 ($26,600) (Sulek 2012). Some places in Qinghai
(Gruschke 2008, 2011; Yeh and Lama 2013) and Kumaon
(Garbyal et al., 2004) initially permitted collection of
yartsa gunbu by outsiders, but later imposed restrictions.
Exclusionary practices have benefitted Tibetans in one
area by opening new opportunities to act as middlemen in
the trade (Gruschke 2011: 225). Others areas, such as
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Riwoche and Tengchen Counties in the TAR, closed their
gathering grounds to outsiders early on (Winkler 2008a).
In Nagchu and Nyingtri Prefectures of the TAR, Winkler
(2008b) reports that people from the more densely
populated Shigatse Prefecture are permitted to collect
yartsa gunbu. Other scholars confirmed this while
conducting research in Shigatse Prefecture on seasonal
labor migration (Goldstein et al. 2008). In 2006, one
man reported that he traveled annually to Nagchu with
a contractor from a neighboring village. Being wellconnected in the nomad region through his work, Nagchu
residents permitted the contractor to participate in the
yartsa gumbu harvest. He assigned four of his workers
to the task, for which they were paid their normal
construction wage of ¥28 per day ($3.70). The contractor
relinquished half of the harvest to locals and sold the other
half on the open market for a net profit of over $5,000. In
contrast, Stewart (2014) reports that road construction
crews have overwhelmed local efforts to exclude outsiders
in Shusong Village, Yunnan, to the point where their
gathering is now unregulated.
In the area surrounding China’s Baima Xueshan Nature
Reserve in Yunnan Province, Weckerle and colleagues
(2010) report that, although it is technically illegal to
harvest yartsa gunbu in the nature preserve, authorities
are unwilling to enforce a restriction on such an important
income source for local families. Village committees along
with the nature reserve’s staff implemented regulations to
permit camping only at designated sites where all garbage
must be collected and burned, prohibit cutting trees for
fuel, and mandate that all holes made by extracting yartsa
gunbu must be repaired.
Bhutan is the only country to institute a national-level
management strategy (Cannon et al. 2009). In 2004 the
government relaxed laws on gathering yartsa gunbu in
order to provide locals with an incentive to police their
areas and protect natural resources. The government
permitted yak herders who normally graze in an area
where yartsa gunbu is found to collect during June; only
one member per household could participate. In 2008 the
limitation on collectors per household was relaxed and
more decision-making power delegated to the local level
(Cannon et al. 2009: 2272-2273). Bhutan’s government
legislated that yartsa gunbu can only be sold at authorized
auctions by authorized collectors. Buyers must be
Bhutanese nationals who could sell to international or
domestic markets. The government imposes a 4.9% levy
on sales to cover the expenses of auctions and to support
environmental protection programs (Cannon et al. 2009).
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Selling the Product
In Tibetan areas of China the yartsa gunbu market is
unregulated. Collectors sell to middlemen of their choice
who come directly to gathering sites or conduct their
business in nearby market towns. Some sell their product
before cleaning it, which provides less profit but requires
less effort, whereas others increase profits by cleaning
and drying the yartsa gunbu first (Winkler 2008a). Yeh
and Lama (2013: 11) describe how some transactions
are conducted in the traditional Tibetan manner of
exchanging hand signals, veiled from public view, within
each other’s long sleeves.3
In primary collection areas of Chamdo and Nagchu
Prefectures,TAR, Winkler (2009) estimates that yartsa
gunbu accounts for 70-90% of household cash incomes. In
Domkhok Township, Qinghai, some households are able
to earn ¥200,000 ($26,600) per season by either collecting
themselves or leasing access to outside collectors; those
who sell their herds and live mainly off yartsa gunbu fare
just as well as those who continue to keep large yak and
sheep herds. Therefore, many nomads are reducing herd
sizes or eliminating livestock altogether because herding
requires far more annual labor than collecting yartsa gunbu
(Sulek 2012). A similar process seems to be occurring
in Bhutan. Profits ranged from $38 to $2,541 with top
collectors earning nearly the equivalent of a teacher’s
annual salary for little over a month’s work, prompting
some to buy land at lower altitude in anticipation of one
day giving up herding altogether (Cannon et al. 2009).
Tibetans in China use yartsa gunbu profits to start entrepreneurial activities, such as shops, or as a means to secure
bank loans (Winkler 2008b, 2009; Gruschke 2011). Others
use the income to invest in cattle and jewelry (Gruschke
2008), cover healthcare expenses, improve the condition
of their housing, buy motorcycles and other items such as
televisions and DVD players (Winkler 2008a, 2008b; Sulek
2012). In addition, some take the opportunity to gain merit
in a culturally appropriate manner by making large donations to monasteries (Winkler 2008a). In Bhutan, collectors
use their income to pay school fees or buy items like solar
panels and mobile phones (Cannon et al. 2009).
This overview indicates that management practices and
economic impacts vary across the region. In areas where
yartsa gunbu is found, people can realize profits far beyond
their income from farming and herding. Tibetans are using
the cash to improve their standard of living, and in some
cases are reducing dependency on agro-pastoral activities
by becoming entrepreneurs. Thus, the yartsa gunbu trade
is transforming social and economic life in ways that

development initiatives in China and the highlands of
surrounding nations have been unable to match. However,
Yeh and Lama argue that the trade may act to further
marginalize Tibetans in China by “making them highly
vulnerable to the whims of Chinese urban consumer
demands through a narrowing of livelihood options” (2013:
3). Other scholars express concern over the sustainability
of the harvest (Sharma 2004; Cannon et al. 2009; Stewart
2009; Winkler 2009, 2012; Weckerle et al. 2010; Shrestha
and Bawa 2013). In contrast, in this article we provide
details on the ways that residents of two valleys in Nepal
have devised a set of regulations that are equitable and
potentially sustainable.
Yartsa Gunbu in Nubri and Tsum
Although it may be true in some parts of Nepal that,
“restrictions on harvest have been unsuccessful” (Shrestha
and Bawa 2013: 519), evidence from Nubri and Tsum
can provide a counterpoint to this general claim. The
contiguous valleys of Nubri and Tsum are inhabited by
ethnic Tibetans who until recently made their living
primarily through farming, herding, and trans-Himalayan
trade (see Figure 1). Agricultural land is privately owned,
and is acquired through patrilineal inheritance. In
exchange for paying taxes to the village administration
and local temples, land-owning households have the right
to exploit communal resources which include forests and
high altitude pastures. The right to use pastures is critical,
because that is where yartsa gunbu can be found.

Tsum is divided into two VDCs (Village Development
Committees).4 Chhekampar, the upper VDC, is comprised
of 11 villages with a population of roughly 1,500. Only
residents of Chhekampar have access rights to the pastures
where yartsa gunbu is found. Nubri consists of four VDCs.
The highest, Samagaun, consists of two villages (Sama and
Samdo, population 778) which have abundant high altitude
pastures and thereby access to the most fertile yartsa gunbu
areas in the valley. The next highest VDC, Lho (population
roughly 1,000), has limited pastures and hence much less
yartsa gunbu. The two lowest VDCs, Prok and Bihi, have
very few pastures where yartsa gunbu is found.
The research for this paper was undertaken in 2011 and
2012.5 In 2011 we spent five weeks in Nubri studying
migration, family management practices, and household
economic strategies. In Sama, one of several research
villages, we conducted in-depth interviews with 18 householders (nine men and nine women) ranging in age from
31 to 53 (average age of 41.3). Each interview was conducted in Tibetan and included questions about yartsa gunbu:
who gathered it, how much they earned, how they spent
the money, and perceived impacts on the community. We
also interviewed two elderly lamas (age 75 and 79) and one
young lama (age 36), as well as two village leaders. Some
clarifying information was obtained during subsequent
visits and phone conversations.
The economic data presented in this paper comes from
the 2012 Household Survey of Nubri, Tsum, and Mustang

Figure 1. Map showing
location of Nubri and
Tsum in Nepal.
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conducted by Cynthia Beall, Geoff Childs and Sienna Craig.
The survey gathered demographic information on every
individual in the study area, and economic information
on every household including how much money they had
made from the previous yartsa gunbu harvest. We also
spent time in the yartsa gunbu camps and thereby gathered
first-hand information at the primary harvesting sites.
All residents of Tsum’s Chhekampar VDC, which include
anyone who was born in a local household regardless
of where they currently reside, have the right to gather
yartsa gunbu on communal grazing grounds located oneday’s walking distance from any village. Thus, a man or
woman who was born in Chhekampar VDC but now lives
in Kathmandu, India, or any other country has the right
to return and participate in the harvest. The patrilineal
assignment of collection rights is highlighted by the fact
that local men’s wives who are not born in Tsum can
participate, whereas local women’s husbands who are not
born in Tsum and are not residing in the territory cannot.
All other non-residents are prohibited from gathering
yarts gunbu on VDC territory. Previously, non-residents
from villages below Chhekampar VDC could pay a fee to
gather, but locals barred them in 2010 due to concerns
over crowding and fighting in the camps and the presence
of outsiders during the harvest season when many houses
are left empty. Security of personal property outweighed
any income gained through the issuance of permits. The
only non-residents who can gather are household servants
who have lived in Chhekampar VDC continuously for at
least one year, and, as mentioned above, non-resident
wives of local men.
Other than excluding outsiders, the collection process is
not tightly regulated in Tsum. According to data gathered

through interviews and first-hand observation, residents
of the uppermost villages travel to the gathering grounds
in April and report back when they see evidence that yartsa
gunbu is emerging. Afterwards, people begin establishing
camps in highland pastures that they use for summer grazing. Shelters range from typical herding huts with stone
walls covered by woolen tents, to plastic tarps stretched
over bamboo poles. In order to share logistics people travel
and camp in groups comprised of friends and relatives.
Parents recall sons and daughters attending distant
boarding schools to help with the harvest. The majority
of householders participate—even pregnant women who
sometimes give birth at the camps. Only small children,
the elderly, monks and nuns, and a few families of hereditary lamas do not collect yartsa gunbu.
People from Tsum sell their product to middlemen from
Tibet. Most people use their income, which ranged from
NRs2,000-NRs300,000 in 2011 ($24 to $3,530) to buy food
and clothing from markets in TAR, China. As a result,
consumption habits have changed; people eat more rice
and display their wealth status by serving visitors powdered milk and coffee. Although Tsum’s residents do not
have a custom of depositing money into savings accounts,
some purchase gold and other types of jewelry which are
not only status symbols but a way of storing wealth. Locals
are also building new homes and renovating old ones, and
showing an entrepreneurial spirit by building lodges that
cater to foreign tourists.
Traditionally, Tsum’s residents were reluctant to gather
yartsa gunbu on the grounds that doing so constituted
the killing of a living being. According to a local saying,
“Digging up one worm is equivalent to killing one fully
ordained monk.”6 Nowadays, however, 83% of household

Figure 2. Yartsa
gunbu collectors’
shelter, Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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Figure 3. Cleaning yartsa gunbu
prior to sale, Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)

Figure 4. Sama Village, Nubri.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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non-farm income in Tsum comes through the collection
and sale of yartsa gunbu (see Table 1). A strong economic
incentive has prevailed over the aversion to commit what
was once considered a harmful action that would provoke
negative consequences.7
In comparison, yartsa gunbu collection is more
systematically controlled in Nubri’s Samagaun VDC where
management practices involve a combination of village
regulations (yul khrims) and religious regulations (chos
khrims). Until now, the local VDC government has taken
responsibility for devising and implementing management
practices and regulations.8 Samagaun’s leaders recognized
early on that some regulations could help ensure an
equitable and sustainable harvest. Based on the amount
of snow cover in the highland pastures and other factors,
village leaders set a date for the commencement of the
harvest. In the weeks prior to the official starting date
every able-bodied resident must physically check in at
the community meeting house four times daily (7:00am,
10:00am, 2:00pm, and 6:00pm). The roll call is designed
to thwart attempts by any individual to begin collecting
earlier than others. Anybody who fails to check in or is
caught venturing to the high pastures before the starting
date incurs a heavy fine. Village leaders also have the
authority to postpone collection when conditions warrant.
For example, in 2012 the best areas were still covered by
snow in late May so leaders suspending the harvest for a
week in order to allow conditions to improve.
Yartsa gunbu is found on a common resource (pastureland)
and therefore is treated as a common resource. The right
to gather yartsa gunbu is held by any bona fide resident
of the village, a status defined through participation in a
household taxation system (Childs 2005). Each household
must register its collectors with the village administration
and pay a yartsa gunbu tax of NRs100 ($1.20) for the first
household member and NRs4,500 ($53) for each additional
member. The money is spent on common purposes, such
as inviting a lama to perform a communal empowerment
ritual (dbang), repairing the hydroelectric system, or
paying litigation costs when disputes arise with other

VDC (Valley)

Yartsa Gunbu Income

villages. To guard against outside poachers, the village
pays a few men a daily salary to guard the richest
harvesting grounds.
Religious regulations (chos khrims) are mechanisms
designed to prevent people from exploiting resources in
sacred areas. For example, Gang Pungyen (Mt. Manaslu,
8,156m) is considered to be the residence of Sama’s
protector deity (yul lha). Lamas in Sama shield certain
tracts of land on the slopes of Gang Pungyen through
‘sealing decrees’ (shag rgya) that prohibit people from
cutting trees, gathering forest products, or hunting
wildlife.9 Recently, Sama’s lamas added yartsa gunbu
collection to the list of prohibited activities in designated
sacred areas (see also Winkler 2008b; Boesi and Cardi 2009).
Yartsa gunbu has become such an important contributor
to household economies that during harvest season
local schools shut down and parents recall to the village
children who are living elsewhere. As one man stated,
In our village, all recent developments and rises
in income are due to the collection of yartsa
gunbu. That is why, if there are four members
in a household, all four will go. If there are five
members, all five will go. Everyone engages in the
harvest, regardless of whether they are a lama,
layperson, or village leader.
Like in Tsum, the people of Nubri sell their yartsa gunbu
to middlemen from Tibet who pay in cash; competition
among middlemen continually drives the price upwards.
Several young residents of Sama facilitate the trade and
increase their profits by taking interest-free loans from
a middleman, buying yartsa gunbu from fellow villagers,
and then selling the product back to the money lender.
Middlemen use this strategy to capture a greater share of
the market.
In 2011 the most successful households made around
NRs400,000 ($4,700) from yartsa gunbu. However, fortunes
vary because some people are more adept at collecting
than others. One woman complained that her son is an

Total Income (Includes
Remittances)

% of Total Income
from Yartsa Gunbu

Lho (Nubri)

NRs 12,800 ($151)

NRs 13,900 ($164)

92.1%

Chhekampar (Tsum)

NRs 40,900 ($481)

NRs 49,300 ($580)

83.0%

Samagaun (Nubri)

NRs 69,400 ($816)

NRs 90,200 ($1,061)

76.9%
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Table 1. Average
Income per
Household by
Source and Village.
Beall, Childs, and
Craig, 2012 Nubri,
Tsum, and Mustang
Household Survey

incompetent collector and lamented, “What rotten luck!
Some individuals can find one or two thousand pieces, but
we could manage a mere 375. The money we got only lasted for a month. That’s all.” Nevertheless, even a relatively
low tally garners a significant influx of cash considering
that, prior to yartsa gunbu, the most lucrative income generating activity was ferrying mountain climbers’ loads to
Manaslu Base Camp for NRs1,500 ($18) per trip.
Table 1 demonstrates that yartsa gunbu provides the
majority of income for the residents of the three VDCs
where yartsa gunbu is found, but also shows considerable
variation.10 Samagaun has the most abundant highland
pastures and therefore profits the most from the harvest.
Instant Income: Pros and Cons
There is no question that yartsa gunbu has brought a much
needed economic boost to Nubri and Tsum. The valleys
were relatively wealthy prior to the 1960s due to their
position along trans-Himalayan trade routes (Snellgrove
1989). However, the development of a road system on
the Tibetan Plateau combined with frequent border
closings eroded trade. By the 1990s the only way people
in Nubri could make ends meet was to sell timber across
the border to Tibet. People lamented at that time, “We
trade or we starve” (Childs 2004). Nowadays, most people
we interviewed use at least some of their income to fulfill
subsistence needs. One man from Sama explained,
There is no other source of cash income in the
village.11 The yearly produce from land is not
enough to feed us even when we include dairy
products. In the past, people would make do
with little income. These days, even with more
cash, people still fall short. Nevertheless, in the
yartsa gunbu era people have plenty to eat and
good clothes to wear. They can use the money to
buy rice, grain, butter, clothes, shoes, salt, and
everything from Tibet.
The income is especially important for poorer families
who have little land and cannot produce enough food for
the entire year, but can now purchase food from Tibet.
For example, a woman living in one of the poorer households in Sama stated that she and her husband made about
NRs100,000 ($1,176) from yartsa gunbu. When we asked
what she did with the income, she responded,
I feed my family with this money. That’s it. We
don’t have much land so we can’t invest it in
farming, and it is not enough to buy animals. So we
pick yartsa gunbu and from that money we run our

household. If we could get lots of money, we could
save it for a child’s education but the money is only
enough to feed us.
Similar to Tsum, some people use the income to finance
house construction or buy jewelry. One man said he
uses some of his income to purchase more bovines, and
noted that yartsa gunbu is partially responsible for the
recent increase in herd sizes. A Sama resident also stated,
“Parents are taking more responsibility for their children
who are in [boarding] school. They take interest in the
children’s diet and clothing. They won’t just ignore the
children once they had been admitted in school and
receive sponsorship.”
The newfound wealth also contributes to religious life.
Some people reported using their money to gain merit
by sponsoring rituals or embarking on pilgrimages. One
man noted that people are becoming more generous and
making larger donations to monasteries. We observed that
annual religious festivals have become more elaborate
as evidenced by the higher quality costumes worn by
participants, and the higher value donations of food and
material items. Because some of these festivals effectively
redistribute food during the lean part of the year (Childs
2005), the benefits of sponsoring communal rituals can
filter down to poorer members of the community.
Yartsa gunbu income insulates people from onerous funeral
expenses that can lead families into debt. Providing a
proper funeral ceremony is culturally appropriate and
socially significant in Tibetan societies. Funeral rites assist
the deceased person’s consciousness (rnam shes) navigate
through bardo, the intermediary realm between death and
rebirth. Failure to provide the full set of rituals can result
in the consciousness becoming trapped in bardo or rebirth
in a hell realm. One man explained that, in the past when
a person died, members of the household would scramble
to accumulate sufficient funds to sponsor ceremonies
that stretch over the course of seven weeks. He recalled
incidents where families had to sell livestock, jewelry, and
even land to afford a proper funeral ceremony. Nowadays,
yartsa gunbu income can provide the cash needed to
perform last rites.
Many people in Sama expressed worries about negative
developments associated with the yartsa gunbu trade,
including a sharp rise in drinking. Instead of just drinking
locally distilled beverages, which are limited in quantity by
the amount of grain on hand, cash allows men to purchase
cheap, potent liquor from China. The increase in drinking
prompted Sama’s residents to form a Women’s Association

HIMALAYA Volume 34, Number 1 | 15

Figure 5. Yartsa gunbu is
the best source of income
today in Nubri and Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)

(Maili Samiti) that immediately took action by instituting a
ban on Chinese liquor. According to their president,
The reason [for the prohibition] is that Chinese
liquor is very cheap. Therefore, people in the
village drink a lot of it. People get drunk and get
into fights. After getting drunk on Chinese liquor,
men gamble day and night. When their children
and wives get sick, nobody is around to take care
of them. So we decided to form the association and
do something about it. Most people in the village
support this ban. Those who drink a lot complain
that we have stopped them from getting the
cheaper liquor. If you drink too much of the cheap
liquor, you know it causes health issues and harm
to your body. That is why we have banned the sale
of Chinese liquor.
Many people are unused to managing large amounts of
money and end up spending their earnings very quickly.
Gambling, which used to be confined to a brief period
around the Tibetan New Year (January-February), is now
common during and after the yartsa gunbu harvest. Bets of
NRs1,000 ($12) or more—almost unheard of in the past—
are commonplace. As one man put it, “People who are
actually poor act as if they are rich. They spend lavishly
and want others to see them as rich.”
Furthermore, when we asked a village leader whether yartsa gunbu is changing local lives, he responded,
I can say there had been some changes; changes in
the way people eat, drink and live. But the change
is not proportionate to the economic boom. The
changes are not evident in households or in the
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village in general. I guess it can be attributed to
unwise spending. When the people of Sama travel
outside the village, they spend a lot of money. The
hoteliers down valley are happy to have guests
from Sama because they spend a lot. They don’t
know how to manage cash.
One man was despondent over his son’s recent spending
binge. After telling us that his family earned NRs250,000
($2,940) from the previous yartsa gunbu harvest, he explained, “We put the money in a trunk. My son took that
money and spent it all in a couple of days in Kathmandu.
I could do nothing. If I question him, he will fight with
me. So I didn’t say anything.” When we probed whether
he thought other people squandered their yartsa gunbu
income, he continued,
Take me for example. If I could collect 100 worms
today, I would spend 500 rupees on drinking. We
are not thinking right. Most of us are like that.
There are many hotels around here where we
get together and drink. But some people can save
well. If your wife is smart, then you can save some
money. People like me end up with nothing. We
only think about the present and live life as it
comes.
A young, influential religious leader in Sama is concerned
over changing cultural values and financial mismanagement in his village and has organized advising sessions for
young men where he counsels them to value traditions
and use income in ways that can benefit their families. For
example, he recommends they invest in appreciable assets
like jewelry, and set aside funds to help children attain a

better education. Only time will tell whether people heed
his advice.
The boom in income from yartsa gunbu seems to be
changing norms of social interaction. As one man
commented,
The people of our village are peaceful in general
but since the commencement of yartsa gunbu trade
have become boorish. Earlier, we only had village
meetings once or twice a year. Nowadays there are
frequent meetings with more arguments between
people, more squabbles. People are becoming more
selfish.
When we asked whether the sudden change in economic
conditions is affecting inter-generational relations, an
elderly lama responded,
Things of the past are left behind. This is because
of the huge income one can gain from collecting
yartsa gunbu without doing much hard work. During
our parents’ time our lineage was highly respected
because we are descendants of the religious kings
(chos rgyal) of Tibet.12 As we have aged we have
continued observing the old values. Modern values
are different. We don’t attend all the gatherings of
the lay people. Their thinking is incompatible with
ours (sems pa mthun mi ‘dug); our experiences and
the things we have seen are different. Even if we go
to the meetings, neither are [our ways of thinking]
compatible nor do they listen to us. Therefore,
it is better if we don’t go to these gatherings.
Modern and traditional thoughts do not match.
[Young] people here say, “There is no point talking
about traditional thoughts. Leave aside the talk of
traditions and let’s talk about who’s wealthier.”
According to this lama, the breakdown of both social and
generational hierarchies is due to many people achieving
upward mobility through lucrative activities that do not
require much work, and by their use of newfound wealth
as a sign of status (see also Yeh and Lama 2013: 10-11). He
went on to lament that young people nowadays,
[D]on’t show any respect, they say we are old
people. The little respect I receive is primarily
because I am a practitioner of Buddha’s teaching
and people invite me to perform some religious
activities. Other than that, there is no role for us
in other [secular] matters. When I talk with people
nowadays they all say, ‘you and me’ (khyod dang
nga).

Traditional Tibetan social norms are based on the concept
of ‘order by seniority’ (rgan gzhon go rim), meaning that
younger people should treat their elders with respect
through deferential actions (giving them the most comfortable seats, serving them first) and verbal interactions.
In Tibetan linguistic convention, honorific speech (zhe sa)
refers to ‘speech whose very words show respect’ (Agha
1993: 132). With respect to pronouns, ‘khyed’ and ‘sku nyid’
are honorific forms of ‘you’ that should be used when addressing a person of higher age or social status. In contrast,
people of lower or equal age and social status are typically
addressed using the term ‘khyod.’ To address an older lama—a person who occupies the pinnacle of the local social
hierarchy—using ‘khyod’ represents a linguistic rupture
of traditional social norms. The lama interprets this as
evidence that the youth are disregarding the traditional
age-based social order.
In May 2013 we learned through interviews and
participant observation that elderly community
members no longer attend village meetings in Sama.
Their reluctance is in response to disrespectful actions
by young men who raise their voices and interrupt them,
and devalue their traditional knowledge by claiming that
time-honored regulations are no longer applicable. It is
impossible to determine whether an erosion of the agebased status system would have occurred in the absence
of yartsa gunbu. What is clear, however, is that Sama’s
younger generation gained sudden access to a lucrative
income source. By doing so they become less dependent
on guidance from the elderly, and seem less inclined to
adhere to traditional social norms.
Sustainable Development?
The World Conservation Strategy (IUCN et al. 1980) first
highlighted the need for ‘sustainable development’, an
approach to simultaneously address poverty, inequality,
and environmental concerns (Hopwood et al. 2005). After
the Brundtland Report defined sustainable development as
“development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43), the concept has been
thoroughly debated, refined, and appropriated by different
interest groups to fit various agendas (Hopwood et al.
2005).
Haughton identified five interconnected ‘equity
principles’ that, if “not addressed singly and collectively,
then inevitably the ability to move toward sustainable
development will be critically undermined” (1999: 235).
The first, inter-generational equity, encapsulates the
Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development
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Figure 6. Horsemen
between Sama and
Samdo, Nubri.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)

cited above. The second, intra-generational equity, refers
to socioeconomic equity within a society at a given
time. The third, geographic equity, “requires that local
policies should be geared to resolving global as well as
environmental problems,” whereas the fourth, procedural
equity, advocates for regulatory transparency in which
all individuals are treated fairly. Finally, inter-species
equity is a call for maintaining biodiversity by treating
the survival of all species on an equal basis with humans
(Haughton 1999: 235-237). Although we do not have
sufficient data to fully address all of these principles, we
have enough to comment on inter-generational equity,
intra-generational equity, and procedural equity.

a result, roughly 50,000 people ventured to highland
pastures in 2010 in search of yartsa gunbu (Shrestha and
Bawa 2012: 518). This mirrors a trend in other open-access
areas where increasing competition reduces per capita
yields (Winkler 2009). Although Winkler (2009) initially
expressed guarded optimism that yartsa gunbu is resilient
in the face of increased collection, he recently noted that
competition has generated a worst case scenario in places
where people extend the picking season beyond the time
when yartsa gunbu reaches its peak value. Not only do they
extract an inferior product with lesser market value, they
reduce the number of spores that can be released to infect
next year’s crop (Winkler 2012: 38-39).

Does the current rate of harvest of yartsa gunbu
compromise the ability of the future generation to meet
its own needs (inter-generational equity)? As Winkler
points out, “Any resource of such immense value, and
key relevance to rural livelihoods as the main cash
source, runs the risk of being over-exploited” (2009:
306). Rising commercial demand has spurred a sharp
increase of collecting and, consequently, concerns over
the sustainability of the yartsa gunbu harvest (Sharma
2004; Cannon et al. 2009; Winkler 2009, 2012; Weckerle et
al. 2010; Shrestha and Bawa 2013). Although insufficient
data exists to track long-term trends with certainty
(Winkler 2009), one study in Dolpa, Nepal, indicates a
recent decline in the volume of yartsa gunbu gathered and
a local perception that current collection practices are
unsustainable (Shrestha and Bawa 2012). Importantly,
Dolpa allows outsiders access to collection grounds. As

Several scholars argue that community-based management
practices can be effective mechanisms to ensure
sustainability (Cannon et al. 2009; Stewart 2009; Weckerle
et al. 2010; Shrestha and Bawa 2013). The absence of strong
government presence has allowed the residents of Nubri
and Tsum the autonomy to combine novel and traditional
regulations that can potentially moderate collection
intensity and ensure long-term sustainability of yartsa
gunbu. Religious decrees prohibit collecting in certain
sacred areas thereby ensuring that part of the landscape
will remain undisturbed. Furthermore, regulations limit
the number of collectors by excluding outsiders. In the
case of Samagaun VDC, if we eliminate those locals who are
unlikely to participate in the harvest (monks and nuns, the
disabled, children under five, adults 55 and older, people
who live elsewhere) and assume that parents can recall all
children residing in boarding schools in Kathmandu, only
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400 of 780 VDC residents (51% of the population) would
gather yartsa gunbu. In comparison, in Majphal, Dolpa
District, where access is open to outsiders, Shrestha and
Bawa (2013) counted 2,600 collectors—nearly double the
VDC’s population.
Is everyone treated in a fair and transparent manner
under the rules and regulations governing yartsa gunbu
(procedural equity)? Policies in Samagaun VDC are decided
through public meetings in which issues are debated then
resolved by consensus. Everyone from the wealthiest to
the poorest household must adhere to the same starting
date for gathering yartsa gunbu, a policy that is designed
to facilitate equal access to the collection grounds. The
daily roll call is done in public so everyone knows who is
present in the village, and who is absent. Every household
is beholden to the same level of taxation, and the use of
revenue is decided by committee to fulfill agendas that
benefit the entire community. Although some individuals
no doubt try to bend or circumvent the rules, the yartsa
gunbu regulation system is designed and administered in a
manner that is meant to be transparent and equitable.
Can the yartsa gunbu harvest reduce the gap between rich
and poor (intra-generational equity)? Traditionally, wealth
status was determined by a combination of ‘external
wealth’ (byi’i nor; arable land and domesticated animals)
and ‘internal wealth’ (nang gi nor; jewelry, sacred objects,
and other valuable household items). Poor families
possessed scant external and internal wealth, and stood
little chance to acquire more. However, in the yartsa gunbu
economy a poor family with a sufficient labor force can
obtain substantial cash income. Thus, several people we
interviewed commented that yartsa gunbu income makes
life easier for everyone, including the poor. As a senior
lama explained,
People are doing very well by collecting and selling
yartsa gunbu. With this huge income, they can buy
livestock, household goods and improve their
lives. If this new business of yartsa gunbu had not
happened, people would have to work hard like
they used to do in the past by farming, carrying

loads, and collecting wood. In the past wealthy
people did not have to work hard physically while
the poorer people had to go everywhere down
the valley and up the mountains and work very
hard to earn a living. These days, everyone has
attained wealth and there is a leveling [of economic
differences].
Although intra-generational equity appears possible under
Sama’s harvesting regulations, the variation in income
yields among participating households (NRs4,000–540,000)
shows that outcomes are not uniform. Table 2 displays a
positive relationship between the number of household
residents and yartsa gunbu income. The same relationship
also holds true between household size and traditional
signifiers of wealth: land and cattle. Because households
that are already relatively wealthy tend to have larger labor forces, the yartsa gunbu harvest may be simultaneously
improving everyone’s standard of living and increasing
wealth inequity within the villages. This is a topic that
merits further research.
In conclusion, people across the Tibetan Plateau and
Himalayan region are grappling with issues associated
with yartsa gunbu: how to effectively manage a common
resource, how to ensure equitable access, and how to deal
with the sudden influx of income. They are confronting
these issues using a combination of traditional regulations
and novel ideas. The results are mixed. On the negative
side, some areas have witnessed the degradation of
pastures, turf wars and violence, discordant social
relationships, and heavy drinking. On the positive side,
yartsa gunbu provides an opportunity for people to
improve their standard of living, start business ventures,
enhance religious life, provide better education for
children, and mitigate the economic burden associated
with deaths in the family. Household-level improvements
are being accomplished independent of state-sponsored
development initiatives, and in the case of Nubri and Tsum
management practices that were devised independent of
state interference may prove to be sustainable over the
long-run.

Household
Residents

Number of
Households

Yartsa Gunbu
Income

Land in Local
Units

Bovines

1-2

41

NRs 61,390

19.7 ’bre

5.6

3-5

76

NRs 81,266

42.2 ’bre

12.3

6+

16

NRs 152,656

58.2 ’bre

20.6

Total

133

NRs 83,727

37.0 ’bre

11.1

Table 2. Household
Residents by Income
and Economic Assets,
Samagaun VDC.
Beall, Childs, and
Craig ,2012 Nubri,
Tsum, and Mustang
Household Survey
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Endnotes
1. On the life cycle, geographical range, and history of
collection of yartsa gunbu see Winkler (2008a, 2009), and
Zhang et al. (2012).
2. See Winkler (2012) for a critical review of press reports.
Yartsa gunbu has been viewed as a sexual stimulant in
Tibetan and Chinese medicine for centuries. Zurkhar
Nyamnyi Dorje, a 15th-century doctor and scholar,
composed a text describing the benefits of yartsa gunbu
in which he wrote, “It bestows inconceivable advantages.
Thus, it increases the Seven Bodily Constituents. Among
these, particularly it serves best for the purpose of libido,
increasing offspring and improving vitality.” (Winkler 2008b:
32-36 contains the Tibetan text and its translation).
3. Tibetans from Qinghai report that bartering through the
exchange of hand signals is an old practice, employed while
haggling over animal skin prices with non-Tibetan traders,
which may be related to the fact that sometimes sellers and
buyers do not speak a common language. Furthermore,
since most transactions take place in the open along
roadsides, exchanging hand signals within sleeves ensures
that other people do not know the prices which may be

20 | HIMALAYA Spring 2014

advantageous to the buyer (personal communications,
July 2013).
4. Village Development Committees (VDC; Gāun Bikās
Samiti in Nepali) are sub-district political divisions
designed to link local communities and the state with the
goal of improving the delivery of services. Control over
local resources can fall under the purview of the VDC
government, or can be usurped by larger organizations such
as National Parks and Conservation Area Projects.
5. The 2011 research was supported by a Washington
University Faculty Research Grant. The 2012 project, Genes
and the Fertility of Tibetan Women at High Altitude in
Nepal, was funded by the National Science Foundation
(Grant No. BCS-1153911, PI Cynthia Beall, co-PIs Geoff
Childs and Sienna Craig).
6. ‘bu gcig ’bru na dge slong gcig bsad pa ’dra bo yin/
7. See Yeh and Lama (2013: 6-7) for an insightful discussion
of Tibetan moral perspectives on the yartsa gunbu harvest
and environmental degradation. See also Winkler (2008b:
29).
8. Yartsa gunbu collection grounds are managed by
different entities throughout Nepal. In some districts, like
Manang, the Conservation Area Management Committee
is tasked with collecting fees, whereas in other areas
permission to harvest is granted by the Department of
Forestry, a National Park, a Buffer Zone User Group, or a
Community Forest User Group (Devkota 2010: 95-96).
9. Prohibiting hunting and other disturbances around
sacred mountains has a long history in the Tibetan world.
One practice is territorial ‘sealing’ (rgya dom pa) that has
two different but parallel traditions under the heading ri
rgya lung rgya (‘sealing the hills and valleys’). The first is
‘monastic codes of rights and regulations’, and the second
is public decrees or laws by a ruler (Huber 2004: 133).
Huber also describes local forms of sealing territory called
ri khrims or ri rgya (‘laws on hills’ or ‘sealing of hills’)
which are performed for two related reasons: to protect
economically valuable resources such as game animals,
timber, and medicinal plants, and to restrict activities that
potentially disturb local deities.
10. The data presented in Table 1 do not constitute a
complete economic picture. The residents of Lho have
immense forest resources and regularly travel to Tibet to
exchange timber for grain, wool, and other essential items.
Residents of Samagaun, who have far less forest resources,
use income from yartsa gunbu to buy grain and wool.
Therefore, the economic disparity between the VDCs is not
as large as Table 1 suggests.

11. In fact there are a few other sources of cash income,
including portering and occasional wage labor, so we
presume he means no other that can compare in scale.
12. See Childs (2004) on the history of the prestigious
Ngadag lineage in Sama.
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